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I.

INTRODUCTION

The opioid crisis is one that continues to astonish the public. 1 From
the lack of accountability, poor government oversight, inconsistent
enforcement, and an all-out failure to bring it to a head, the crisis is a neverending disaster seemingly playing on loop. 2 The question that experts ask
and fail to answer is what remedies courts should consider in future
settlements beyond monetary damages and whether the suggested remedies
† Dennis Davis is a 2021 graduate of Mitchell Hamline School of Law. The author previously
served in the United States Air Force and is a Retired Federal Law Enforcement Officer.
The author would like to thank the Health Law Institute at Mitchell Hamline School of Law
for inspiring the Article. More importantly, the Author would like to give special thanks to
his wife, Ashley, for her support while both pursued their Juris Doctor together, and his three
children, Dennis, Adrianna, and Valkyrie, for their understanding and support.
See generally Cobin D. Soelberg, Raeford E. Brown, Derick Du Vivier, John E. Meyer &
Banu K. Ramachandran, The US Opioid Crisis: Current Federal and State Legal Issues, 125
ANESTHESIA & ANALGESIA 1675 (2017).
See id.; see also ENERGY & COMMERCE COMM. MAJORITY STAFF REP., 115TH CONG., RED
FLAGS AND WARNING SIGNS IGNORED: OPIOID DISTRIBUTION AND ENFORCEMENT
CONCERNS IN WEST VIRGINIA 6 (2018) [hereinafter W. VA. RED FLAGS REPORT].
1
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would help in preventing a recurrence of another opioid-type public health
crisis. While this question is important and deserves an answer, it is not the
correct question that needs to be asked presently.
As the adage goes, “a bad tree does not yield good apples.” As such,
experts should first ask why the opioid crisis has been able to grow at an
alarming rate since the introduction of Purdue’s OxyContin in 1995 and
continues to grow twenty-seven years later. 3 Only after answering this initial
question can the question of what can be done to prevent another opioidtype public health crisis be answered permanently. While it is hard to grasp
such a large-scale failure with multiple facets needing to be looked at and
evaluated, the opioid crisis is the epitome of the “Pareto Principle,” 4 and the
resolution of one cog, which in this case is the Controlled Substances Act
itself and its enforcement, will create a resolution to the opioid epidemic
itself. 5
II.

A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC

Since the Drug Enforcement Administration’s (“DEA”) founding in
1973, its sole purpose is to enforce controlled substances laws. 6 As of 2019,
the DEA had a workforce of 4,924 special agents and 5,245 support staff
for a total of 10,169 employees with a budget of $3.17 billion dollars. 7 While
the employee breakdown distinguishes special agents and support staff, it
does not break it down further by job function. 8 As such, some may be
janitors, secretaries, assistants, analysts, supervisors, etc. who are required to
do many other jobs than just ensuring compliance by opioid manufacturers. 9
As of 2019, there were 1,840,501 registrants 10 that the DEA oversees, and
this number continues to grow at an estimated three percent annually. 11 To
3

See infra Part II.

The “Pareto Principle,” also known as the 80/20 Rule, assumes that eighty percent of all
effects are caused by twenty percent of the causes. What Is the Pareto Principle? Definition
and Meaning, MKT. BUS. NEWS, https://marketbusinessnews.com/financial-glossary/paretoprinciple/ [https://perma.cc/854H-Q4NR].
See infra Part III.
Mission, U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., https://www.dea.gov/about/mission
[https://perma.cc/YD38-SAWF].
Staffing and Budget, U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., https://www.dea.gov/data-andstatistics/staffing-and-budget [https://perma.cc/KN53-4JMK] [hereinafter Staffing and
Budget]. Between the introduction of OxyContin in 1995 and 2019, the DEA budget has
more than tripled from $1.001 billion to $3.17 billion. Id.
4

5
6

7

8
9

See id.
See id.

DEA “registrants” refers to those involved with manufacturing, distributing, dispensing,
importing, exporting, or handling controlled substances, and requires registration and
approval from the DEA. See DRUG ENF’T ADMIN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., DRUGS OF ABUSE:
A DEA RESOURCE GUIDE 11 (2020).
See Registration & Reregistration Fees for Controlled Substance and List I Chemical
Registrants, 85 Fed. Reg. 14810, 14815 (Mar. 16, 2020) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1301)
(“Currently, the [DEA’s Diversion Control Program] regulates over 1.8 million registrants.
10
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put these numbers into perspective, for every single DEA employee, there
are 181.31 registrants. 12 If each employee were to do nothing but oversee
the registrants, that would allow for 13.2 minutes per week on each
registrant. 13 The numbers clearly show that the disparity between the
number of DEA employees and registrants is negligent at best. 14 More
realistically, it is a wanton disregard for the safety and health of those they
claim to protect. 15
While the DEA is tasked with enforcement of the controlled substance
laws and regulations, 16 the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) is tasked
with ensuring that only drugs and devices proven to be safe and effective are
approved for sale and marketing to specific target groups. 17 However,
looking at the FDA’s “Timeline of Selected FDA Activities and Significant
Events Addressing Opioid Misuse and Abuse,” it is apparent that while the
FDA was aware of the ongoing public health crisis, it chose to aid and abet
the DEA’s wanton disregard by failing to address the opioid crisis through
action. Rather than halting the approval process for new opioids until the
epidemic could come under control, the FDA chose to continue approving
while holding public meetings to discuss the public health crisis posed by
opioids. 18 The following briefly outlines selected FDA activities and
significant events addressing opioids.
From 1911 to the 1990s, the primary use of opioid medications was
for the treatment of acute pain in cancer patients. 19 In 1987, MS Contin was
approved and became the first opioid pain medication formulation that
allowed dosing every twelve hours instead of every four to six hours. 20
Duragesic, the first opioid pain medication in the form of a patch, which
allowed it to be changed every three days, was approved in 1990. 21
OxyContin was approved in December 1995, which was marketed as a less
addictive opioid due to its believed “controlled-release” formula. 22 In 1998,
Actiq (fentanyl) was approved as the first pain medication to treat cancer
DEA’s regulated industry increases approximately 3 percent per year annually. It is estimated
that there will be over 2 million registrants by 2023.”) [hereinafter Registration & Registration
Fees].
See id.; Staffing and Budget, supra note 7.
See Registration & Registration Fees, supra note 11; Staffing and Budget, supra note 7.
See Registration & Registration Fees, supra note 11; Staffing and Budget, supra note 7.
See Registration & Registration Fees, supra note 11; Staffing and Budget, supra note 7.
Mission, supra note 6.
What We Do, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/what-we-do
[https://perma.cc/5W8S-FAXG].
12
13
14
15
16
17

Timeline of Selected FDA Activities and Significant Events Addressing Opioid Misuse and
Abuse, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/media/126835/download
[https://perma.cc/2C6X-AJG2] (Mar. 30, 2021) [hereinafter Timeline of Selected FDA
Activities].
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; OxyContin: Balancing Risks and Benefits: Hearing of the Committee on Health, Educ.,
Lab., and Pensions, 107th Cong. 77–770 (2002) (statement of Sen. Jack Reed).
18

19
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breakthrough pain. 23 In the early 2000s, reported opioid overdose deaths
rose significantly and the number of people admitting using OxyContin
recreationally increased from 400,000 in 1999 to a staggering 2.8 million
people in 2003. 24
In 2001, additional warnings were added to the label of OxyContin,
pointing out the potential for misuse and abuse. 25 By January 2003, the FDA
issued a warning letter to Purdue Pharma for misleading advertisements. 26
In 2006, Fentora (fentanyl buccal) was approved. 27 Purdue Pharma and
three of its executives pled guilty and paid a fine of $634 million for lying
about the addictiveness of OxyContin in 2007. 28 Then in 2009, Onsolis
(fentanyl) and Embeda (morphine sulfate and naltrexone) were approved. 29
Additionally, in 2009, the FDA held a stakeholder meeting to ask for help
developing an effective opioid Risk Evaluation Mitigation Strategies
(“REMS”) program with the Industry Working Group (“IWG”), which
consisted of pharmaceutical representatives from twenty-two companies. 30
A significant percentage of deaths and overdose from opioids,
especially from ER/LA opioids, results from theft of pain
medicine from medicine cabinets and accidental exposure to the
drugs. Since 2009, FDA has worked with DEA and other
organizations to help educate the public on safe disposal of
Timeline of Selected FDA Activities, supra note 18; Highlights of Prescribing Information,
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.
(Dec.
2016),
U.S.
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2016/020747s043s044lbl.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8E8G-Z3QS] (Actiq).
Timeline of Selected FDA Activities, supra note 18.
23

24
25
26
27

Id.
Id.
Id.

This was the first settlement regarding Purdue Pharma’s deceitful and illegal marketing of
its drug OxyContin. Barry Meier, In Guilty Plea, OxyContin Maker to Pay $600 Million,
N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/business/11drugweb.html [https://perma.cc/Q4YX-GXUY]. Another was in 2020 for $8.3 billion and
included pleading guilty to three felony criminal charges, including conspiracy to defraud the
United States and violate anti-kickback laws. Brian Mann, Federal Judge Approves
Landmark $8.3 Billion Purdue Pharma Opioid Settlement, NPR NEWS (Nov. 17, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/11/17/936022386/federal-judge-approves-landmark-8-3-billionpurdue-pharma-opioid-settlement [https://perma.cc/AG6L-VSQA]. The most recent
settlement was approved in 2022 for $6 billion. Lauren del Valle, A US Bankruptcy Judge
28

Approved Purdue Pharma and Sacklers' $6 Billion Settlement Agreement with States,
Connecticut AG Says, CNN (Mar. 10, 2022), https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/09/us/us-

bankruptcy-judge-approves-purdue-pharma-sacklers-settlement/index.html
[https://perma.cc/9N6J-PMBL].
Timeline of Selected FDA Activities, supra note 18; Highlights of Prescribing Information,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.
(Dec.
2016)
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2016/022266s017s018lbl.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A8C7-2LXK] (Onsolis); Medication Guide, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(Apr. 2014), https://www.fda.gov/media/77512/download [https://perma.cc/4KYD-6ALA]
(Embeda).
Timeline of Selected FDA Activities, supra note 18
29

30
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opioids when they are no longer needed for pain. 31
In 2010, the FDA approved a new formulation of Purdue’s
OxyContin, which caused the medication to change into a gummy
consistency if an abuser attempted to crush it. 32 Three additional
medications were approved in 2011 by the FDA, including Abstral
(fentanyl), Oxecta (oxycodone hydrochloride), and Lazanda (fentanyl). 33
The FDA approved Subsys (fentanyl sublingual spray) in 2012. 34 During the
2013 calendar year, drugs containing hydrocodone were rescheduled from
a Schedule III to a Schedule II controlled substance. 35 Throughout 2014,
the FDA approved Evzio (naloxone), Targiniq ER (oxycodone
hydrochloride and naloxone hydrochloride), and Hysingla ER
(hydrocodone bitartrate). 36
The FDA approved OxyContin (oxycodone) for use on certain
pediatric patients in 2015. 37 During November 2015, the FDA approved
MorphaBond (morphine sulfate) and Narcan nasal spray (naloxone). 38 In
2016, Xtampza ER (oxycodone), Probuphine (buprenorphine), and
Troxyca ER (oxycodone hydrochloride and naltrexone hydrochloride)
were approved. 39 In 2017, Arymo ER (morphine sulfate), Vantrela ER
(hydrocodone bitartrate), and RoxyBond (oxycodone hydrochloride) were
approved. 40 The FDA approved the first generic version of Suboxone
(buprenorphine and naloxone) and the first oral Sufentanil pain medication
in 2018. 41 On September 20, 2019, the FDA issued a statement on the
agency’s continued efforts to increase the availability of all forms of
naloxone in the attempt to reduce overdose deaths. 42 Olinvyk (oliceridine)

31
32
33

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.;
Onsolis,
DRUGS.COM
(Jan.
17,
2022),
https://www.drugs.com/onsolis.html#:~:text=Onsolis%20was%20discontinued%20in%20Jul
y%202011.&text=The%20Onsolis%20brand%20name%20has,may%20be%20generic%20e
quivalents%20available [https://perma.cc/WW84-5YNZ].
Timeline of Selected FDA Activities, supra note 18.

34

35

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
FDA Approves First Generic Versions of Suboxone Sublingual Film, Which May Increase
Access to Treatment for Opioid Dependence, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (June 14, 2018),
36
37
38
39
40
41

https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-approves-first-generic-versionssuboxone-sublingual-film-which-may-increase-access-treatment
[https://perma.cc/NNG5H4HS].
Norman E. Sharpless, Statement on Continued Efforts to Increase Availability of All Forms
of Naloxone to Help Reduce Opioid Overdose Deaths, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept.
20, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/statement-continuedefforts-increase-availability-all-forms-naloxone-help-reduce-opioid-overdose
[https://perma.cc/9VYT-8WWG].
42
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was approved in 2020. 43 Then, by March 2021, the FDA approved
Hydrocodone bitartrate. 44
Combining an overwhelmed DEA tasked to enforce the
fundamentally flawed Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (“CSA”) with the
FDA’s continuous approval of highly addictive opioids since 1987, paints a
horrific picture: 10.1 million people admitting to misusing prescription
opioids in 2019. 45 Of the 10.1 million people, 1.6 million misused
prescription pain relievers for the first time. 46 Additionally, 1.6 million
people admitted to having an opioid disorder between 2019 and 2020. 47
Since it has become more difficult for patients, both legitimate users and
abusers to obtain opioids, the number of illicit drug users has risen. 48 As
such, 2 million people admitted to using methamphetamine in 2019, while
745,000 people admitted to using heroin. 49 Of those 745,000 heroin users,
50,000 admitted it was their first time. 50 With all of these opioid users, it
comes as a sad but not surprising realization that of the 70,630 people who
died in 2019 from a drug overdose, 51 48,006 were attributed to overdosing
on synthetic opioids other than methadone and 14,480 deaths were
attributed to overdosing on heroin. 52
With such disturbing numbers all around, it is disheartening that
legislators, regulators, and experts failed to address the root cause of the
epidemic and continue to wonder how they can resolve the crisis through
the judicial system with only the patient, public, and private businesses on
trial. This Paper will evaluate the foundation on which the crisis is built and
43
44

Timeline of Selected FDA Activities, supra note 18.
Id.; Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations,

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/
results_product.cfm?Appl_Type=A&Appl_No=208269#348
[https://perma.cc/5QB9WXZ2].
See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., KEY SUBSTANCE USE AND
MENTAL HEALTH INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2019
NATIONAL
SURVEY
ON
DRUG
USE
AND
HEALTH
(2020),
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/
files/reports/rpt29393/2019NSDUHFFRPDFWHTML/2019NSDUHFFR090120.htm
[https://perma.cc/9H5W-6ZYW].
Id. at 60.
Id. at 40.
45

46
47
48
49
50

Id.
See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 45.
Id.

“In 2019, 70,630 drug overdose deaths occurred in the United States for an age-adjusted
rate of 21.6 per 100,000 standard population.” Holly Hedegaard, Arialdi M. Miniño &
Margaret Warner, Drug Overdose Deaths in the United States, 1999–2019, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION
(Dec.
2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/databriefs/db394.htm [https://perma.cc/SG3A-F3R6].
See The Opioid Epidemic by the Numbers, U.S. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Feb. 2021),
https://www.hhs.gov/opioids/sites/default/files/2021-02/opioids-infographic.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A4XM-UZYH] (providing statistics from the 2019 National Survey on
Drug Use and Health, 2020 and the National Center for Health Statistics’ National Vital
Statistics System, Provisional Drug Overdose Death Counts).
51

52
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work to resolve the single cog in this “Pareto Principle” 53 issue known as the
Controlled Substances Act.

A. Current Foundation of Opioid Oversight
During the 1960s, fear of illicit drug use, both domestically and by
soldiers serving overseas in the Vietnam War, heavily increased. 54 Along
with the fear of drug use, civil disobedience was a hot topic, as many
opposed the United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War, which created
the perfect platform for President Nixon to run on. 55 “Law and Order” and
the “War on Drugs” were ideas that most of society could get behind and
in turn, assisted with getting Nixon elected to the office of the president. 56
To make good on promises of tackling the surge in drug use, the 91st United
States Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970 (“CDAPCA”). 57 Title II of the CDAPCA established
what is known as the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”). 58

1. The Controlled Substances Act
In June 1971, President Nixon stated that drug abuse was “public
enemy number one” and officially declared a “war on drugs.” 59 To ensure
that the CSA was enforced, Nixon went on to create the DEA on July 1,
1973. 60 While it is reasonable to believe the government has the best interest
of the public in mind when passing laws, the real purpose may be more
despicable. 61 No government official has been more truthful than Ronald
53
54

See MKT. BUS. NEWS, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
Adam Janos, G.I.’s Drug Use in Vietnam Soared—with Their Commanders’ Help,

HISTORY
(Aug.
29,
2018),
https://www.history.com/news/drug-use-in-vietnam
[https://perma.cc/YB26-ADS4].
See Emily Dufton, The War on Drugs: How President Nixon Tied Addiction to Crime,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 26, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/03/the-war-ondrugs-how-president-nixon-tied-addiction-to-crime/254319/
[https://perma.cc/4NL9CD8V].
55

56
57

See id.
See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention & Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-513, 84

Stat. 1236 (1970).

See id; See also 21 U.S.C. § 801.
Chris Barber, Public Enemy Number One: A Pragmatic Approach to America’s Drug
Problem,
RICHARD
NIXON
FOUND.
(June
29,
2016),

58
59

https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2016/06/26404/ [https://perma.cc/ET9V-7YCN].
See Exec. Order No. 11,727, 38 Fed. Reg. 18,357 (July 6, 1973).
Tom LoBianco, Report: Aide Says Nixon’s War on Drugs Targeted Blacks, Hippies, CNN
(Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/23/politics/john-ehrlichman-richard-nixondrug-war-blacks-hippie/index.html [https://perma.cc/6DT5-GPUG].

60
61

You want to know what this was really all about? The Nixon campaign in 1968,
and the Nixon White House after that, had two enemies: the antiwar left and
black people. You understand what I’m saying? We knew we couldn’t make it
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Reagan in his August 12, 1986 speech when he stated, “The nine most
terrifying words in the English language are: I’m from the government, and
I’m here to help.” 62
Although amended numerous times, the CSA established the
classification system for controlled substances and the general controls that
pertain to each schedule. 63 Currently, five schedules of controlled substances
have been established known as Schedules I, II, III, IV, and V. 64 These
controlled substances are scheduled based upon three factors: their abuse
potential, accepted medical applications in the United States, and their
safety and potential for addiction. 65 Regardless of their classification,
scheduled drugs need additional controls regarding the manufacture,
dispensing, distribution, and prescribing to protect the public. 66
Schedule I products are defined as a drug or other substances with a
high potential for abuse, that currently have no accepted medical use in
treatment in the United States, and that lack an accepted safety for use of
the drug or other substance under medical supervision. 67 Examples of a
Schedule I substance are heroin, LSD, marijuana, MDMA, and ecstasy. 68
Schedule II products are defined as a drug or other substance with a
high potential for abuse, which does have an accepted medical use in
treatment in the United States or a currently accepted medical use with
severe restrictions, with abuse potentially leading to severe psychological or
illegal to be either against the war or black, but by getting the public to associate
the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both
heavily, we could disrupt those communities. We could arrest their leaders, raid
their homes, break up their meetings, and vilify them night after night on the
evening news. Did we know we were lying about the drugs? Of course, we did.

Legalize
It
All,
HARPER’S
MAG.
(Apr.
2016),
Dan
Baum,
https://harpers.org/archive/2016/04/legalize-it-all/ [https://perma.cc/P6JW-RFZY].
See Reagan Quotes & Speeches, RONALD REAGAN PRESIDENTIAL FOUND. & INST.,
https://www.reaganfoundation.org/ronald-reagan/reagan-quotes-speeches/news-conference1/ [https://perma.cc/3VWV-38M3].
See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b), (c). The Controlled Substances Act defines an opioid as “any drug
or other substance having an addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining liability similar to
morphine or being capable of conversion into a drug having such addiction-forming or
addiction-sustaining liability.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(18).
See 21 U.S.C. § 812(a) (“Such schedules shall initially consist of the substances listed in
this section. The schedules established by this section shall be updated and republished on
a semiannual basis during the two-year period beginning one year after October 27, 1970
and shall be updated and republished on an annual basis thereafter.”).
See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)–(5) (“Except where control is required by United States
obligations under an international treaty, convention, or protocol, in effect on October 27,
1970, and except in the case of an immediate precursor, a drug or other substance may not
be placed in any schedule unless the findings required for such schedule are made with
respect to such drug or other substance.”).
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., DIVERSION INVESTIGATOR’S MANUAL § 5126 (1996).
See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1).
Controlled
Substance
Schedules,
U.S.
DRUG
ENF’T
ADMIN.,
https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/schedules/ [https://perma.cc/77CV-EM6B].
62

63

64

65

66
67
68
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physical dependence. 69 Examples of Schedule II substances are Oxycodone,
Fentanyl, Morphine, and Hydrocodone. 70
Schedule III products are defined as a drug or other substances with a
potential for abuse less than drugs in Schedule I and II, and that have an
accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, with abuse
potentially leading to moderate psychological or physical dependence. 71
Although Schedule III drugs and products are considered less dangerous
than Schedule II, it is important to keep in mind that they are potent
substances, which require additional controls mandated by the CSA to
prevent diversion and misuse. 72 Examples of Schedule III substances are
ketamine, Tylenol with codeine, Suboxone, and Tridal. 73
Schedule IV products are defined as a drug or other substance with a
low potential for abuse relative to Schedule III drugs, and that have an
accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, with abuse
potentially leading to limited psychological or physical dependence relative
to Schedule III drugs. 74 Examples of Schedule IV substances are Xanax,
Soma, and Ambien. 75
Schedule V substances are: drugs with a low potential for abuse relative
to Schedule IV; have an accepted medical use in treatment in the United
States; and whose abuse can potentially lead to limited psychological or
physical dependence relative to Schedule IV drugs. 76 Examples of Schedule
V substances are Lomotil and Lyrica. 77
Additionally, the CSA requires that all major participants in the
controlled substance supply chain (manufacturers, distributors, dispensers,
and prescribers) be registered, thus creating the so-called “closed system.” 78
It further defines the basic controls expected of both manufacturers and
distributors. 79 A critical condition for granting and maintaining a
manufacturer or distributor’s registration is the “maintenance of effective
controls against diversion of particular controlled substances into other than
legitimate medical, scientific, and industrial channels.” 80 The failure of any
registrant “to refuse or negligently fail to make, keep, or furnish any record,
report, notification, declaration, order or order form, statement, invoice, or
69
70

See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(2).
Drug Scheduling, U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., https://www.dea.gov/drug-information/drug-

scheduling [https://perma.cc/HB8L-V55E].
See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(3).
Drug Scheduling, U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., supra note 70.
Id.; Controlled Substances, DEA DIVERSION (Nov. 18, 2021), https://www.deadiversion.
usdoj.gov/schedules/orangebook/c_cs_alpha.pdf [https://perma.cc/2K84-WVJQ].
See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(4).
See Drug Scheduling, supra note 70.
See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(5).
See Drug Scheduling, supra note 70.
21 C.F.R. § 1306 (2010).
71
72
73

74
75
76
77
78
79

Id.

21 U.S.C. § 823(e)(1); see also 21 U.S.C. § 823(a)(1), (b)(1) (governing manufacturers and
distributors respectively).

80
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information required” by the CSA is a criminal offense. 81
The Code of Federal Regulations establishes a series of steps that
manufacturers and distributors are required to institute, including the
following:
Before distributing a controlled substance to any person who the
registrant does not know to be registered to possess the controlled
substance, the registrant shall make a good faith inquiry either
with the Administration or with the appropriate State controlled
substances registration agency, if any, to determine that the
person is registered to possess the controlled substance. 82
Next, “design and operate a Suspicious Order Monitoring (“SOM”)
system to disclose to the registrant suspicious orders of controlled
substances, and “inform the Field Division Office of the Administration of
suspicious orders when discovered.” 83 Then, “[n]otify the Field Division
Office of the Administration . . . in writing, of any theft or significant loss of
any controlled substances within one business day of discovery of the theft
or loss.” 84 Finally, ensure any common carriers used in the supply chain have
sufficient security measures in place to prevent losses during transit. 85

2. Amendments & Safeguards to the Controlled Substances Act
a. The Chemical Diversion & Trafficking Act
In 1988, the CSA was amended to include the Chemical Diversion
and Trafficking Act (“CDTA”). 86 The CDTA helps to provide a system of
controls and criminal penalties with regard to domestic and international
diversion. 87 This is done without the interruption of access to the chemicals
required for legitimate commerce. 88 Additionally, the CDTA defines
precursor chemicals, which include N-Acetylanthranilic acid, Anthranilic
acid, Ergotamine tartrate, Ergonovine maleate, Phenylacetic acid,
Ephedrine, Pseudoephedrine, Benzyl cyanide, Benzyl chloride, and
Piperidine. 89 Alternatively, essential chemicals include Potassium
permanganate, Acetic anhydride, Acetone, and Ethyl ether. 90
Further, the Act established a mechanism and criteria for adding or
81
82
83

See 21 U.S.C. § 842(a)(5).
See 21 C.F.R. § 1301.74(a).
See id.; see also Masters Pharm., Inc. v. DEA, 861 F.3d 206 (D.C. Cir. 2017); 21 C.F.R. §

1301.74(b) (“Suspicious orders include orders of unusual size, orders deviating substantially
from a normal pattern, and orders of unusual frequency.”).
21 C.F.R. § 1301.74(c).
See id. at § 1301.74(e).
21 U.S.C. 801.

84
85
86
87
88
89
90

See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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deleting chemicals from such lists. 91 In turn, criminal penalties result from
the following unlawful conduct: (1) possession, manufacture, distribution,
sale, importation, or exportation of a precursor or essential chemical, and
(2) possession, manufacture, distribution, or importation of drug
manufacturing equipment, tableting or encapsulating machines, and gelatin
capsules. 92

b. The Chemical Handler's Manual
To provide guidance regarding the amended CSA and the passage of
additional chemical control laws, the DEA created the Chemical Handler’s
Manual (“CHM”). 93 The 2004 edition of the CHM stated,
when a regulated person suspects that an order may be intended
for illicit purposes, good practice requires that every reasonable
effort be made to resolve those suspicious. In addition to making
the required reports, the transaction should not be completed
until the customer is able to eliminate the suspicions. The
distributor may have to forego some transactions. 94
Appendix E-3 of the CHM described a “voluntary formula” to be used
by distributors to wholesale and retail levels. 95 The formula calculated the
quantity which, if exceeded in one month, constitutes an order which may
be considered excessive or suspicious and therefore requires reporting to
DEA. 96
91
92
93

Id.
Id.
See Karen P. Tandy, Laura M. Nagel & Patricia M. Good, Chemical Handler’s Manual,

U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Jan. 2004), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/open/legacy/
2014/05/09/2004-chemical-handlers-manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Q3Y-5RNQ]; see also
Expert Report of Dr. Seth B. Whitelaw ¶ 5.3, In re National Prescription Opiate Litigation,
No. 18-OP-451321 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 15, 2019).
See Tandy et al., supra note 93, at 19.
See id. at 41.
94
95
96

Id.

1. Add purchase quantities for the last 12 months for all customers within same
Distribution Center and for customer type (Hospital, Pharmacy or Other) for
any List I chemical containing item stocked by the Distribution Center.
2. Add Customer months for every record used in above total. (Months within
the last 12 that customer purchases of the item were not zero.)
3. Divide total quantity purchases by the total customer months.
4. Then multiply by the factor below to give the maximum amount that the
customer can order per month before showing up on the suspicious order
report. Note: Factor equals 3 for C-II and C-III Controlled Substances
Containing List I Chemicals and 8 for C-III-IV-V Controlled Substances and
non-Controlled OTC products containing List I chemical items.
5. At the end of each month, a report will be transmitted to DEA (separate
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c. Suspicious Order Monitoring
i. National Wholesale Druggist Association’s Suspicious Order
Monitoring Program
In 1987, the National Wholesale Druggists’ Association (“NWDA”)
developed a suspicious order monitoring program based on the DEA’s
Automated Reports and Consolidated Order System (“ARCOS”)
dictionary. 97 The DEA requires that drug manufacturers and distributors
actively monitor orders of all controlled substances and report excessive
orders, as part of their drug diversion surveillance. 98 The agency allows
companies to set up systems of their choosing, not necessarily based on the
ARCOS dictionary. 99 Furthermore, the DEA also has not strictly defined
what constitutes an excessive order. 100
ii. Healthcare Distribution Management Association’s Guidelines
In 2008, the Healthcare Distribution Management Association created

reports for List I Chemicals and Schedule II-V Controlled Substances) of all
purchases of List I Chemicals and/or CII-V Controlled Substances and List I
containing OTC items by any customer whose purchase quantities exceed the
parameters (above) any (2) consecutive months or in three (3) of any moving six
(6) month period. Using a computer to manage and report on high volume
transaction business activities with extremely short order cycle times (receipt to
delivery) is the only viable, cost effective methodology for the reporting of orders
which may be considered excessive or suspicious.

Id.
See NWDA “Suspicious Drug Order” Monitoring Program, PINK SHEET (May 11, 1987),
97

https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS011879/NWDA-SUSPICIOUS-DRUGORDER-MONITORING-PROGRAM [https://perma.cc/683T-46U5]. In 2000, the
National Wholesale Druggists’ Association became the Healthcare Distribution
Management Association (“HDMA”), reflecting the “Association’s vision of a progressively
more efficient and effective distribution system” and in 2016 HDMA became the Healthcare
Distribution Alliance (“HDA”), to reflect the organization’s growing role as a convener of
the supply chain both domestically and globally. See History, HEALTHCARE DISTRIB. ALL.,
https://www.hda.org/about/hda-history [https://perma.cc/J3TJ-EBYD].
98
99
100

Id.
See id.
See id.; see also Letter from J. Rannazzisi, Deputy Assistant Adm’r, Off. Of Diversion

Control, to All Registrants (Sept. 27, 2006) [hereinafter DEA Letter, Sept. 27, 2006]; Letter
from J. Rannazzisi, Deputy Assistant Adm’r, Off. Of Diversion Control, to All Registrants
(Feb. 7, 2007) [hereinafter DEA Letter, Feb. 7, 2007]; Letter from J. Rannazzisi, Deputy
Assistant Adm’r, Off. Of Diversion Control, to All Registrants (Dec. 27, 2007) [hereinafter
DEA Letter, Dec. 27, 2007]; Letter from J. Rannazzisi, Deputy Assistant Adm’r, Off. Of
Diversion Control, to All Registrants (June 12, 2012) (informing registrants that the DEA
does not endorse a particular system or sets of controls) [hereinafter DEA Letter, June 12,
2012].
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voluntary anti-diversion guidelines based upon the DEA’s guidance. 101
While each entity will need to make them fit their individual organization,
general guidelines were created which include the following: knowing your
customer due diligence; monitoring for suspicious orders; suspending or
stopping an order of interest shipment; investigating orders of interest; filing
suspicious order reports with DEA; and implementing employee training
and standard operating procedures, among additional recommendations. 102
iii. The Diversion Control Division
The Diversion Control Division (“DCD”) is a division of the DEA with
a mission to “prevent, detect, and investigate the diversion of controlled
pharmaceuticals and listed chemicals from legitimate sources while ensuring
an adequate and uninterrupted supply for legitimate medical, commercial,
and scientific needs.” 103 The DCD primarily completes its mission by
requiring all non-practitioners to implement physical security and other
controls established by 21 C.F.R. §§ 1301.72–.76(a). 104 These controls
include: making a good faith inquiry to determine if the person or entity
receiving controlled substances is authorized to receive them; 105 maintaining
a system to detect and disclose suspicious orders; 106 notifying the DEA of
thefts or significant losses; 107 and ensuring any common carriers used in the
supply chain have adequate security measures to prevent losses. 108
As laid out by the DEA regulations, a manufacturer’s and distributor’s
suspicious order monitoring (“SOM”) program must meet a relatively short
list of requirements. 109 First, the registrant must design and operate a system
to disclose suspicious orders of controlled substances. 110 Accordingly, the
distributor must inform the local DEA field office when the distributor
discovers a suspicious order. 111 At a minimum, orders are deemed
See generally HEALTHCARE DISTRIB. MGMT. ASS’N, INDUS. COMPLIANCE GUIDELINES:
REPORTING SUSPICIOUS ORDERS AND PREVENTING DIVERSION OF CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCES 13 (2008).
See W. VA. RED FLAGS REPORT, supra note 2; see also Expert Report of Dr. Seth B.
Whitelaw, ¶ 5.3.1 (Apr. 15, 2019).
Diversion Control Division, U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., https://www.dea.gov/operationaldivision/diversion [https://perma.cc/GJ7A-WNS6].
See 21 C.F.R. § 1301.71(a) (2022) (“All applicants and registrants shall provide effective
controls and procedures to guard against theft and diversion of controlled substances. In
order to determine whether a registrant has provided effective controls against diversion, the
Administrator shall use the security requirements set forth in §§ 1301.72–1301.76 as
standards for the physical security controls and operating procedures necessary to prevent
diversion.”).
Id. § 1301.74(a).
Id. § 1301.74(b); see also DEA Letter, Sept. 27, 2006, supra note 100.
21 C.F.R. § 1301.74(c).
Id. § 1301.74(e).
See id. § 1301.74(b).
101

102

103

104

105
106
107
108
109
110
111

Id.
Id.
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suspicious if they are (a) of unusual size; (b) deviate substantially from a
normal pattern; or (c) of unusual frequency. 112
iv. The Rannazzisi Letters (2006–2012)
The Rannazzisi letters are a series of letters written in 2006, 2007, and
2012 by the Deputy Assistant Administrator of the Office of Diversion
Control, Joseph Rannazzisi. 113 These letters were sent to every entity in the
United States that was registered with the DEA as a manufacturer or
distributor of controlled substances to provide guidance on suspicious
orders and the prevention of diversion. 114
The initial letter, dated September 27, 2006, and the subsequent letter,
dated February 7, 2007, were sent out to remind all registrants of their basic
obligations to design and operate a system to flag suspicious orders of
controlled substances and disclose this information to the DEA. 115
Additionally, the September 27, 2006, and February 7, 2007 letters also
specifically note that this requirement is in addition to, and not in lieu of,
the general requirement under 21 U.S.C. § 823(e) that a distributor
maintain effective controls against diversion. 116
These letters further outline “circumstances that might be indicative of
diversion.” 117 These circumstances are outlined as follows. The first
indicator included orders with excessive quantities of a limited variety of
controlled substances with few, if any, other drugs. 118 The second indicator
included orders with a limited variety of controlled substances in quantities
disproportionate to the quantity of non-controlled medication ordered. 119
The third indicator included orders with excessive quantities of a limited
variety of controlled substances with excessive quantities of lifestyle drugs. 120
The final indicator included orders with the same controlled substance from
multiple distributors. 121
See id.; see also Masters Pharm., Inc. v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 861 F.3d 206, 6 (D.C. Cir.
2017) (upholding DEA’s interpretations of its regulations relative to defining a suspicious
order and the timing of reporting); 21 C.F.R. § 1301.74(b).
See supra note 100.
112

113

Id.
Id.
See DEA Letter, Sept. 27, 2006, supra note 100, at 2; see also DEA Letter Feb. 7, 2007,
supra note 100, at 2.
See DEA Letter, Sept. 27, 2006, supra note 100, at 3; see also DEA Letter, Feb. 7, 2007,
supra note 100, at 3 (listing circumstances that might be indicative of diversion).
See DEA Letter, Sept. 27, 2006, supra note 100, at 3; see also DEA Letter, Feb. 7, 2007,
supra note 100, at 3.
See DEA Letter, Sept. 27, 2006, supra note 100, at 3; see also DEA Letter, Feb. 7, 2007,
supra note 100, at 3.
See DEA Letter, Sept. 27, 2006, supra note 100, at 3; see also DEA Letter, Feb. 7, 2007,
supra note 100, at 3.
See DEA Letter, Sept. 27, 2006, supra note 100, at 3; see also DEA Letter, Feb. 7, 2007,
supra note 100, at 3.
114
115
116

117

118

119

120

121
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The third letter in the series, dated December 27, 2007, again focused
on suspicious order monitoring. 122 Distinct from the previous two, this letter
detailed what constitutes timely reporting. 123 This letter also warned
registrants about the use of rigid formulas to define whether an order is
suspicious and that the use of rigid systems may cause a failure in detecting
suspicious orders. 124
The last letter in the series, dated June 12, 2012, reiterated what was
stated in the December 2007 letter and again focused on suspicious order
monitoring like the previous letters. 125 However, this letter focuses on
communication of suspicious orders with the DEA field offices, the means
necessitating reporting, and further steps that must follow reporting. 126 As
such, the DEA specifically states, “Registrants who routinely report
suspicious orders, yet fill these orders without first ascertaining that the
order will not be diverted into other than legitimate medical, scientific, or
industrial channels, are failing to maintain effective controls against
diversion.” 127

B. Compliance Programs and the Mitigation of Punishments
In November 1991, the United States Sentencing Commission
(“USSC”) published the first version of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
for Organizations (“FSGO”) with the purpose of “just punishment” and
“deterrence.” 128 “Just punishment” refers to punishment that corresponds to
the degree of blameworthiness of the offender, while the “deterrence”
model incentives are offered for organizations to detect and prevent crime. 129
The FSGO use a point system (“culpability score”) to determine the
sentencing range for each person or entity convicted of a federal crime. 130
There are then points assigned for each crime. The higher the offense level,
the greater the points, and the harsher the sentence. Factors that increase
punishment include: (1) tolerance of criminal activity; (2) history of criminal
activity; (3) violation of a court order; and (4) obstruction of justice. 131
Meanwhile, two factors exist to mitigate the punishment: (1) self-reporting,
cooperation, or acceptance of responsibility; and (2) sentencing credit for
organizations that have an effective compliance and ethics program
122
123
124
125
126
127
128

See generally DEA Letter, Dec. 27, 2007, supra note 100.
See id.
See id. at 2; see also W. VA. RED FLAGS REPORT, supra note 2, at 233.
DEA Letter, June 12, 2012, supra note 100, at 1.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Paula Desio, An Overview of the Organizational Guidelines, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N,

https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/organizationalguidelines/ORGOVERVIEW.pdf [https://perma.cc/W569-DRBV].
129
130

Id.
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 994.

U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7B1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021) [hereinafter U.S.
SENT’G GUIDELINES 2021].
131
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designed to prevent and detect criminal conduct. 132
The USSC outlined “Seven Elements,” which later became “Eight
Elements” for establishing an effective compliance program. For an
organization to receive mitigation credit and have its compliance program
deemed “effective,” the following elements must be met: 133
1. Organization and Resources
2. Due Diligence
3. Written Standards
4. Training & Communication
5. Monitoring, Auditing & Investigations
6. Corrective Actions
7. Enforcement (i.e., Discipline or other consequences for
violating the standards)
8. Periodic Risk Assessment 134
Because every organization is different in structure, culture, operation,
and mission, each organization’s compliance program will take a different
form. 135 Therefore, it is imperative that each organization implements the
elements in a way that best addresses its specific organizational needs to
mitigate risks. 136
When organizations fail to implement an effective compliance
program, cases that could have been prevented—such as Masters
Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Drug Enforcement Administration—tend to occur. 137
In Masters, the court denied Masters Pharmaceutical, Inc.’s Petition for
Review, seeking to overturn the DEA’s revocation of Masters’ registrant
status. This case is of great importance as the court upheld the DEA Acting
Administrator Chuck Rosenberg’s decision that whenever an order for
controlled substances was “discovered” by the SOMS computer program,
that order was presumptively “suspicious.” 138 Furthermore, based on the
guidance provided by the Rannazzisi Letters, if an order is suspicious and it
is discovered, then it should not be shipped to the customer. 139
There are other methods used to discern whether an order is classified
as suspicious. One of which includes the Park Doctrine, which is also
132
133
134
135
136

See generally id.
Id.
Id. at § 8B.2.1.
See id.
Desio, supra note 128 (“Criminal liability can attach to an organization whenever an

employee of the organization commits an act within the apparent scope of his or her
employment, even if the employee acted directly contrary to company policy and
instructions. An entire organization, despite its best efforts to prevent wrongdoing in its ranks,
can still be held criminally liable for any of its employees’ illegal actions.”).
Masters Pharm, Inc. v Drug Enf’t Admin., 861 F.3d 206 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 216.
See supra note Desio.

137
138
139
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referred to as the responsible corporate officer doctrine. 140 This doctrine is
used to hold individual corporate officers responsible for any violation of
federal law without any unlawful intent, knowledge of the violation, or any
participation in the wrongdoing. 141 The government must prove: the
corporate officer held a position of authority in the corporation; the officer
had the ability to prevent the violation; and the officer failed to prevent the
violation. 142 However, in Masters Pharmaceutical, employees rarely did their
due diligence to investigate the flagged orders that were required to dispel
the suspicion surrounding held orders. 143
III.

FOUNDATIONAL CHANGES TO ENSURE CONSISTENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

To establish consistency, it is necessary that the DEA creates its own
Suspicious Order Monitoring program that all registrants are required to
use and stop passing this requirement off to companies that receive little
guidance and can manipulate the system. In Masters Pharmaceutical, the
SOM system was only four days old when it was reviewed by the DEA. 144
With such little time before the review was conducted, it was apparent that
the SOM system would not be sufficiently tested. 145 A remedy that would
have prevented a defective SOM system would be if the SOM system was
standardized among registrants. The DEA can stop “passing the buck” off
to the registrants and instead design and operate an SOM system that works
for all distributors, manufacturers, retailers, and prescribers.
After public comment, the DEA can design a system that considers the
registrant’s needs, meets statutory requirements, and alerts the DEA to
suspicious orders immediately. 146 This “public comment” should entail an
open dialogue and working sessions with as many registrants as would like
to provide input to create an SOM that has “buy in” from the entire “closed
system.” If retailers or physicians must order through the DEA’s system, it
would send orders directly to the distributor or manufacturer of their
choice, automatically keeping records of every order. Any order alerted as
“suspicious” would automatically stop at the DEA, allowing it to prevent and
investigate potential diversion. 147 If the DEA determines the order is not
suspicious, the DEA will allow the order to proceed to its intended contact.
Additionally, once the manufacturer or distributor sent the order, either
See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 8 (1943); see also United States v. Park,
421 U.S. 658, 17 (1975).
See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 8; see also Park, 421 U.S. at 17.
Park, 421 U.S. at 18.
Masters Pharm., Inc., 861 F.3d at 213.
Id. at 225.
140

141
142
143
144
145
146

Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 109–12 (addressing the current “suspicious order”

standard).
147

See supra notes 103–09 and accompanying text (outlining statutory diversion

requirements).
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would have to input it into the same system, showing the order was shipped.
This type of SOM designed and operated by the DEA would confirm all
electronically-ordered prescriptions comply with their regulations. 148
Additionally, the new system would require handwritten prescriptions to be
logged into the SOM by the pharmacy fulfilling the order prior to dispensing
to the intended patient. This would allow doctors who rely on written
prescriptions or are not “tech savvy” from falling through the cracks of direct
DEA oversight. While this would be more difficult for the DEA to control,
it would provide the distributors, manufacturers, retailers, and prescribers a
better understanding of how to create an effective compliance program. 149
When enforcing controlled substance laws, if the DEA finds a
registrant violated the CSA, it may issue an order to show cause, asserting
why the DEA should not revoke, suspend, or deny registration. 150 If the
violation appears to pose an imminent threat to public health, the DEA may
issue an immediate suspension order, which deprives the registrant of the
right to distribute controlled substances immediately. 151 Orders to show
cause and immediate suspension orders are collectively known as “registrant
actions.” 152
The DEA can enforce suspected violations through a process
collectively known as registrant actions. However, the DEA underutilizes
this authority, which has led to large pharmaceutical manufacturers,
distributors, and retailers failing to perform necessary due diligence. 153
Instead, it allows manufacturers like McKesson, Purdue, Insys, CVS,
Walgreens, Mallinckrodt, and Cardinal Health to provide kickbacks to
prescribers, or ship suspicious orders without providing due diligence to
ensure diversion was not occurring. 154 For example, the DEA allowed
148
149

See supra text accompanying notes 109–12.
See supra notes 133–36 and accompanying text (implementing a variation of the USSC’s

“Eight Elements” for establishing an effective compliance program).
21 C.F.R. § 1314.150; 21 U.S.C. § 824(a).
21 U.S.C. §§ 823–24; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN. EVALUATION
& INSPECTION DIV., I-2014-003, THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION’S
ADJUDICATION
OF
REGISTRANT
ACTIONS
1
(2014),
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2014/e1403.pdf [https://perma.cc/JW2M-C327] [hereinafter
REGISTRANT ACTIONS].
See REGISTRANT ACTIONS, supra note 151.
See U.S. DEP’T JUST. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., 19-05, REVIEW OF THE DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION’S REGULATORY AND ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS TO
CONTROL
THE
DIVERSION
OF
OPIOIDS
1
(2019),
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2019/e1905.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZU5A-RFUQ] (“We found
that DEA was slow to respond to the significant increase in the use and diversion of opioids
since 2000. We also found that DEA did not use its available resources, including its data
systems and strongest administrative enforcement tools, to detect and regulate diversion
effectively. Further, we found that DEA policies and regulations did not adequately hold
registrants accountable or prevent the diversion of pharmaceutical opioids. Lastly, we found
that while the Department and DEA have recently taken steps to address the crisis, more
work is needed.”).
See W. VA. RED FLAGS REPORT, supra note 2, at 60–65.
150
151

152
153

154
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Mallinckrodt to use the term “peculiar order” to ship 37,817 orders between
2003 and 2011 while only reporting 33 as “suspicious.” 155 It also allows
manufacturers to change order amounts to fall below the threshold of
“suspicious.” 156 It also includes failing to follow the guidelines of knowing
your customer and your customer’s customer by placing sales and profits
over a compliance program. 157 All these companies failed the American
public, but it is not completely their fault nor the majority their fault. 158 The
largest portion of blame should be placed squarely on the shoulders of the
federal government and the regulators that have the responsibility and duty
to ensure controlled substance laws are followed. 159

A. Monetary Remedies to Encourage Deterrence
With a strong foundation in place, additional settlement remedies,
including both monetary and non-monetary, are possible and may be
effective in reducing damages currently caused by this crisis and even
thwarting future crises. 160 Not only do many people use opioids to control
chronic pain, but manufacturers of opioids typically produce other
medications consumers need to engage in everyday life. 161 Accordingly,
bankrupting them would do much more harm than good. 162
The notion that a company can be “too big to fail” is an inaccurate one,
as once “Titans of Industry” fail all the time, such as Lehman Brothers
Holdings, Washington Mutual, WorldCom, General Motors, Enron,
Chrysler, Thornburg Mortgage, Pacific Gas and Electric Co. 163 A recent
example of a company that should have been left to its own demise is the
2009 bankruptcy of General Motors in which the U.S. government decided
Scott Higham, Sari Horwitz & Steven Rich, Internal Drug Company Emails Show
to
Opioid
Epidemic,
WASH.
POST
(July
19,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/internal-drug-company-emails-showindifference-to-opioid-epidemic-ship-ship-ship/2019/07/19/003d58f6-a993-11e9-a3a6ab670962db05_story.html [https://perma.cc/FE8R-HNC7].
See W. VA. RED FLAGS REPORT, supra note 2, at 105–06.
See W. VA. RED FLAGS REPORT, supra note 2, at 39.
155

Indifference

156
157
158
159

See generally id.
See 21 U.S.C. § 812; see also supra Parts I, II.

Remedies can be provided in non-traditional ways similar to those provided in “special”
courts like Veterans court, drug court, and other nontraditional judiciaries. See VALOR,
Brochure,
https://www.collincountytx.gov/supervision_corrections/Documents/
VALOR%20Brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/JL5E-HNV3]; Drug Courts, U.S. DEP’T JUST.
(May 4, 2021), https://www.ojp.gov/feature/drug-courts/overview [https://perma.cc/9PZQ93X5].
See generally Manufacturers, MPR, https://www.empr.com/manufactures/letter/m/
[https://perma.cc/WXN5-8Q6A].
160

161

162

Id.

Christopher Tkaczyk, The 10 Largest U.S. Bankruptcies, CNN MONEY (Sept. 15, 2008),
https://money.cnn.com/galleries/2009/fortune/0905/gallery.largest_bankruptcies.fortune/in
dex.html [https://perma.cc/RUT5-HVTC] (Lehman Brothers (slide 1), Washington Mutual
(slide 2), WorldCom (slide 3), General Motors (slide 4), Enron (slide 6), Chrysler (slide 8),
Thornburg Mortgage (slide 9), Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (slide 10)).
163
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that the automaker was “too big to fail” and spent approximately $50 billion
dollars to secure a 61% equity stake in the company. 164 When it came time
to recoup taxpayer’s money, the federal government decided to sell the 61%
stake for a loss of 22.4%, or a loss of $11.2 billion. 165 However, in the field
of pharmaceutical manufacturers, there truly are three companies that are
too big to fail. 166 AmerisourceBergen, Cardinal Health, and McKesson make
up eighty-five percent of pharmaceutical distributions while all other
companies combined make up the remaining fifteen percent. 167 This simple
statistic is enough to determine that although these three industry giants
targeted consumers for their own greedy agenda and actively contributed to
diversion that has cost countless American lives, they truly are needed more
than they need us. 168

B. Non-Monetary Remedies to Encourage Deterrence
The Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (“OIG”)
is required to exclude individuals and entities convicted of:
(1) Medicare or Medicaid fraud, as well as any other offenses
related to the delivery of items or services under Medicare or
Medicaid;
(2) Patient abuse or neglect;
(3) Felony convictions for other health-care-related fraud, theft,
or other financial misconduct; and
(4) Felony convictions for unlawful manufacture, distribution,
prescription, or dispensing of controlled substances. 169
Additionally, the OIG has discretion to exclude individuals and entities
for misdemeanor convictions related to health care fraud, other than
Medicare or Medicaid fraud or misdemeanor convictions in connection
with the unlawful manufacture, distribution, prescription, or dispensing of
controlled substances. 170 The OIG can also suspend, revoke, or surrender a
license to provide healthcare for reasons bearing on professional
competence, professional performance, or financial integrity per its
provision on unnecessary or substandard services. 171 Submitting false or
Eric Beech, U.S. Government Says It Lost $11.2 Billion on GM Bailout, REUTERS (Apr.
30,
2014,
10:03
AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autos-gm-treasuryidusbrea3t0mr20140430 [https://perma.cc/MY89-8E4X].
164

165

Id.

W. VA. RED FLAGS REPORT, supra note 2, at 6
Scott Higham & Lenny Bernstein, The Drug Industry’s Triumph Over the DEA, WASH.
POST (Oct. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/investigations/deadrug-industry-congress/ [https://perma.cc/3W9H-C93G].
166
167

168
169
170
171

See generally id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7.
Id.
Id.
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fraudulent claims to a federal health care program, engaging in unlawful
kickback arrangements, and defaulting on health education loan or
scholarship obligations all warrant exclusion as well. 172
This tremendous power has been given to the OIG for the sole
purpose of protecting the public and the federal government from
unscrupulous individuals and entities. 173 The only issue is that it is rarely
utilized for distributors, manufacturers, or retailers. This power to exclude
is primarily used to punish physicians and health care organizations that
commit False Claim Act (“FCA”) 174 or Anti-Kickback (“AKS”) 175 violations.
It is of the utmost importance for the OIG to work closely with the DEA’s
Diversion Control Division to begin excluding not only the entities, but
executive leadership or board members based on the responsible corporate
officer doctrine. 176 As of now, entity leaders who are experts at determining
return on investments are at risk of losing their freedom for inconsistent
amounts of time. 177 While that is a deterrent for many people, it is not for
all.
Deterrence will be even lower for executive level employees,
considering the first successful Racketeer Influence and Corrupt
Organization (“RICO”) Act case against a pharmaceutical company. John
Kapoor, founder and previous owner of Insys Therapeutics, received sixtysix months in prison and a $250,000 fine for RICO conspiracy, conspiracy
to commit wire fraud, and conspiracy to violate the Anti-Kickback Law. 178
This case would have served as a better deterrent had the judge imposed a
more stringent sentence. 179
Many professional career fields from medical doctors, respiratory
therapists, lawyers, nurses, psychiatrists, electricians, and real estate agents
are required to obtain licenses to practice in their chosen field. 180 Here, amid
172
173

Id.
See generally About OIG, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/about-

oig/ [https://perma.cc/LPE8-7XNW].
31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a–7b(b).

174
175
176
177

United States v. DeCoster, 828 F.3d 626, 632 (8th Cir. 2016).
Compare Doctor Gets 40 Years in Prison for Prescribing Over 500,000 Opioid Doses,

GUARDIAN
(Oct.
3,
2019,
8:22
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2019/oct/03/doctor-joel-smithers-gets-40-years-in-prison-for-prescribing-over-500000opioid-doses [https://perma.cc/P5EC-EWUQ], with Press Release, Founder and Former
Chairman of the Board of Insys Therapeutics Sentenced to 66 Months in Prison, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/inspections-compliance-enforcementand-criminal-investigations/press-releases/founder-and-former-chairman-board-insystherapeutics-sentenced-66-months-prison [https://perma.cc/FK7E-2SGY].

Founder and Former Chairman of the Board of Insys Therapeutics Sentenced to 66
Months in Prison, supra note 177.
See id. (prosecutors sought a fifteen-year sentence for John Kapoor).
Professional Certifications and Occupational Licenses: Evidence from the Current
Population
Survey,
U.S.
BUREAU
LAB.
STATS.
(June
2019),
178

179
180

https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2019/article/professional-certifications-and-occupationallicenses.htm [https://perma.cc/8D7A-HLY6].
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an epidemic that claimed countless lives, anyone can obtain a position with
tremendous power and influence that can directly impact the public welfare
more than most professionally licensed career choices. As such, there is no
logical reason why specific roles within organizations that are registrants for
controlled substances are not required to obtain professional licensing.
Therefore, this Article proposes that all staff directly involved in the
sales, marketing, finance, contracting, distribution, or whoever has any
contact with the public part of the “closed loop” system, must obtain and
maintain a professional license. If an individual is caught violating the law or
ethical policies, they must retake classes and be given community service
that is to be conducted explicitly with or in areas that are being ravaged by
the opioid crisis. 181 Additionally, if they continue to violate policies and laws,
their individual license must be revoked, and the individual is subject to
being banned from ever working, investing, consulting, volunteering, or
acting in any other capacity with products overseen by the DEA. 182 This will
ensure that all licensed staff are held accountable for their decisions.
Volunteering for drug rehabilitation centers on a mandatory annual
basis must be implemented for all registrant executive level employees and
board members. Ideally, this will foster empathy for lives their organization
impacts, which may be just enough to deter negatively impactful decisions.
This remedy will not cost the federal government, state governments, or
taxpayers any additional funds to implement, which is important as the
opioid epidemic has already created a substantial financial burden for the
victims, families, and society. 183 This requirement would be easily tracked
and implemented by requiring all executive leadership and board members
to volunteer at a drug rehabilitation clinic for a minimum of forty hours
before becoming a registrant. 184 Volunteering in this capacity shall take place
on an annual basis to ensure executive and board members can see the faces
of those they impact. 185
It is far too easy to get caught up in the success of an organization and
find ways to mock those that you are victimizing. 186 In West Virginia alone,
AmerisourceBergen distributed 248.16 million dosage units of Oxycodone
and Hydrocodone between 2005 and 2016. 187 The sheer lack of compliance
culture led to employees widely sharing an email about a Beverly Hillbillies
See supra Section III.B.
See supra Section III.B.
See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section III.B.
See supra Part II; supra Section III.B.
Meryl Kornfield, Drug Distributor Employees Emailed a Parody Song about ‘Pillbillies,’
Documents Show, HERALD DISPATCH (May 23, 2020), https://www.herald181
182
183
184
185
186

dispatch.com/news/drug-distributor-employees-emailed-a-parody-song-about-pillbilliesdocuments-show/article_da91c044-1a34-5067-9135-9a0a937728be.html
[https://perma.cc/5RYR-98TN]. Several examples of that involve AmerisourceBergen
Corp., who was one of the largest distributors of opioids, accounting for 13.2% of the United
States distribution. Id.
See W. VA. RED FLAGS REPORT, supra note 2, at 6.
187
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parody, the Pillbillies, which detailed addicted individuals traveling from
Appalachia to Florida to easily obtain opioids at pill mills within the state. 188
Another example is Mallinckrodt’s national account manager, Victor
Borelli, sending an email to a distributor customer stating, “[j]ust like
Doritos keep eating. We’ll make more.” 189
IV.

CONCLUSION

The extraordinary number of regulations imposed on controlled
substances and the amount of damage done is currently happening. 190
Unfortunately, the damage caused by the opioid epidemic is unparalleled
with long lasting and indeterminable effects. 191 The biggest issue is that the
requirements imposed on the registrants, while tremendous, are both vague
and unrealistic. 192 The CSA gave the DEA the task of enforcing controlled
substance laws. 193 In turn, the DEA has given that responsibility to the
registrants via the “closed system.” 194 While the “closed system” sounds great
in theory, it is the equivalent of letting the fox guard the hen house. 195 When
registrants violate the Controlled Substances Act, False Claims Act, AntiKickback Statute, laws and industry standards, the DEA throws its hands
up, almost in disbelief, and gives violators a slap on the wrist. Meanwhile,
the real victims, the public, are becoming addicted to prescriptions and illicit
drugs and often dying in the streets. 196
The greatest balancing act in this epidemic is the one that separates the
abusers from the responsible, legal users. The current system does not
provide any remedy in sight and that is because the DEA, legislators, and
presidents, do not want to take responsibility for the disaster they caused. 197
It has been twenty-six years since Purdue Pharma introduced its “time
release” OxyContin; still, the DEA does not understand why diversion is as
Kennie Bass, Suspicious Deliveries and Opioid-Inspired Parody Songs Highlighted at
Trial, EYEWITNESS NEWS (May 13, 2021), https://wchstv.com/news/local/suspicious-

188

deliveries-and-opioid-inspired-parody-songs-highlighted-at-trial
[https://perma.cc/X33LF3FR]. “Sunny Florida is the place you ought to be[.] So, they loaded up the truck and drove
speedily. South, that is. Pain Clinics, cash ‘n carry. A Bevy of Pillbillies! Well now its time to
say Howdy to Jed and all his kin. And they would like to thank Rick Scott fer kindly inviting
them,” read the lyrics, referring to former Governor Rick Scott. Id. The song continues,
“They’re all invited back again to this locality. To have a heapin helpin of Florida
hospitality. Pill Mills that is. Buy some pills. Take a load home. Y’all come back now,
y’hear?” Id.
Higham et al., supra note 155.
See supra Section II.A.
See supra Part II.
See supra Section II.A.
See The Opioid Epidemic by the Numbers, supra note 52 (providing statistics from the
2019 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, 2020 and the NCHS National Vital Statistics
System, Provisional Drug Overdose Death Counts).
21 C.F.R. § 1306 (2010).
189
190
191
192
193
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Id.
See W. VA. RED FLAGS REPORT, supra note 2, at 6.
See supra Section III.B.
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bad as it is. 198
Designing a SOM controlled by the DEA that all registrants are
required to use would result in mitigating diversion. 199 Creating meaningful
registrant requirements to see firsthand what their products do to people in
their very own community can foster empathy, or at the very least, bring
situational awareness. 200 Punishing these bad actors appropriately, which is
the role of the DEA and OIG, would create the deterrence needed to stop
at least one bad actor when they perform a risk assessment in the future. 201
Simple solutions for a complex problem, posited as the “80/20 rule,” is why
the opioid crisis is the epitome of the Pareto Principle. The resolution of
one cog, which in this case is the Controlled Substances Act and its
enforcement, will create a resolution to the opioid epidemic itself.

Purdue Pharma’s special “time release” OxyContin can be easily overcome by crushing
the pill, which would eliminate any type of special coating that allowed for a timed release.
See supra Part III.
See supra Section III.B.
See supra Sections III.A, B.
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